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INTRODUCTION

“Revenge porn,” 1 otherwise known as the dissemination of
nonconsensual pornography, is the sharing of images or videos that portray
a person engaged in an intimate or sexually explicit act without that person’s
consent. 2 Although the term “revenge porn” would seem to only entail

ǂ JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2021. Winona Yang is a second-generation
Hmong American woman born to political refugees and will be the first in her family to
obtain a Juris Doctor. I thank my family for their tremendous support that allowed me to
complete my legal studies and this Article. I thank my husband, Sieng Lee, and our children,
Weston and Grant, for their patience as I pursued my education. Lastly, I thank Mitchell
Hamline Law Review for its comments and contributions to this Article. This Article is
dedicated to all victims of sexual assault and revenge porn.
“Revenge porn” and “nonconsensual photography” will be used interchangeably in this
Article. The term “revenge porn” has been criticized by scholars as an inaccurate term
because the disseminated content is not limited to disseminators seeking revenge. Alisha
Kinlaw, A Snapshot of Justice: Carving Out a Space for Revenge Porn Victims Within the
Criminal Justice System, 91 TEMPLE L. REV. 407, 409 (2019).
Mary A. Franks, Frequently Asked Questions, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/EEE2-A9F4] [hereinafter Franks,
Frequently Asked Questions]. Apeksha Vora, Into the Shadows: Examining Judicial
Language in Revenge Porn Cases, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 229, 229 (2017) (“Revenge porn,
more formally known as nonconsensual pornography, entails the dissemination of intimate
and/or sexually explicit images of a person without his or her consent. The victim may have
1

2
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sexually explicit content distributed with reprisal, its scope encompasses a
variety of personal content obtained with or without consent, such as
intimate images or videos privately shared with another in the context of a
relationship or unshared content obtained by hackers. 3
Unlike other sex or privacy crimes, “revenge porn perpetuates the
violation by allowing the public to witness the crime, memorializing a
traumatic experience in the victim’s life.” 4 It is an act that rips away one’s
agency. 5 With the rise of internet technology and the use of social media,
revenge porn is an ever-present threat to individuals that take record of their
bodies. “One in [ten] former partners threaten to post sexually explicit
images of their exes online, and an estimated [sixty] percent follow through,”
and more than eighty percent of revenge porn content was recorded as
“selfies.” 6 In our society, in which seventy percent of Americans are active
social media users, 7 one in eight has been a victim of revenge porn. 8 The
“first ever nation-wide study to profile the rates of nonconsensual
pornography victimization and perpetration” determined that women are
1.7 times more likely than men to be victimized or threatened to have their
content released, 9 and other sources report that at least eighty percent of
revenge porn victims are women. 10 These women are most often within the
age of fifteen to twenty-nine years old. 11 Forty-seven percent of victims
contemplate suicide after learning about the dissemination. 12 Furthermore,
revenge porn websites have recently multiplied in number, adding to the
already large availability of pornographic sites that likewise allow users to

taken the photographs herself or the photographs may have been taken, either with or
without the victim’s consent, by the eventual poster.”).
Franks, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2.
Kinlaw, supra note 1, at 411.
Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 309 (2005) (defining “agency”
as “the power of persons, at the individual or collective levels, to develop and achieve creative
goals, including social and political change, within their social environment”).
Amanda Levendowski, Our Best Weapon Against Revenge Porn: Copyright Law?, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/our-bestweapon-against-revenge-porn-copyright-law/283564/ [https://perma.cc/XU7E-YUQH].
Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/L4M4-8U6Z].
3
4
5

6

7

8

Id.

ASIA A. EATON, HOLLY JACOBS & YANET RUVALCABA, 2017 NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY
OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION: A SUMMARY REPORT 4,
12 (2017).
Levendowski, supra note 6.
AMANDA LENHART, MICHELE YBARRA & MYESHIA PRICE-FEENEY, NONCONSENSUAL
IMAGE SHARING: ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF “REVENGE PORN” 5 (2016).
Cynthia Barmore, Criminalization in Context: Involuntariness, Obscenity, and the First
Amendment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 447, 449 (2015).
9

10
11

12
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post and reproduce the content. 13 Whether the private content is
disseminated by text message, e-mail, on a social media platform, or on a
site tailored specifically for revenge porn, the perpetrators often publish the
victim’s personal information such as her name, address, social media
profiles, and employer’s information. 14
Despite these findings, federal and state judicial and legislative
systems have remained stagnant in creating laws that help revenge porn
victims find recourse. As discussed in further detail below, Congress has yet
to pass any federal law that protects victims of revenge porn. 15 Although
forty-five states have passed revenge porn laws to date, 16 many such laws are
too narrow or too broad in breadth, allowing perpetrators to circumvent
them or challenge their constitutional validity. 17 Furthermore, only eleven
Lorelei Laird, Victims Are Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They
Consent
To,
A.B.A.
J.
(Nov.
1,
2013),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_websites_photos_consent
[https://perma.cc/T7WB-7U3Z].
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 350–51 (2014).
At the time this Article was written, there was no federal law criminalizing the
nonconsensual dissemination of sexually explicit or intimate images. In 2017, the “Ending
Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017” (also known as the
“ENOUGH Act”) was introduced in the Senate. The bill “amends the federal criminal code
to make it a crime to knowingly distribute (or intentionally threaten to distribute) an intimate
visual depiction of an individual with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the individual’s
lack of consent, reasonable expectation of privacy, and potential harm; and without a
reasonable belief that such distribution touches a matter of public concern.” S. 2162, 115th
Cong. (2017). However, this legislation is yet to pass. See id. § 1 (as reported by S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, November 28, 2017).
46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVES,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/EFT9-PFB2]. Note
that this source does not take into consideration that section 617.261 of the Minnesota
Statutes has been invalidated by the court, nor does it have updated data as to whether any
other states have invalidated their revenge porn statutes as well.
Although California’s original 2013 revenge porn proposal was drafted to be much more
inclusive, the language of the final bill was so narrow that it was deemed ineffective by victims
and advocates because it only punished people for distributing pictures “that they themselves
had taken of the victim.” Jessica Roy, California’s New Anti-Revenge Porn Bill Won’t Protect
Most Victims, TIME (Oct. 3, 2013), https://nation.time.com/2013/10/03/californias-newanti-revenge-porn-bill-wont-protect-most-victims/ [https://perma.cc/G7A6-DBYA]; CAL.
PENAL STAT. § 647(j)(4) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 17 of 2021 Reg. Sess.). The statutory
language has been updated substantially since then and now includes distribution—personally
or via a third party—and expands the types of images included. CAL. PENAL STAT. § 647(j)(4)
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 17 of 2021 Reg. Sess.). Arizona’s original 2014 statute was
overly broad and did not require any intent by the distributor to cause emotional harm.
Barmore, supra note 12, at 452 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A) (West, Westlaw
through April 20, 2021)) (“It is unlawful to intentionally . . . distribute . . . [an image] of
another person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual activities if the person knows
or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure.”).
However, the law has since been amended to include an intent element—making it more
13

Didn’t

14

15

16

17
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states provide civil remedies for victims of revenge porn. 18 On the one hand,
the increasing number of state legislatures that enact revenge porn statutes
is telling of the severity of the issue and the dire need for a federal law. On
the other hand, even where laws that seem to protect victims exist, victims
may face gender bias in the courtrooms, a bias of which is often injected
directly into a judicial opinion’s interpretation of a statute’s language.
In this Article, I seek to create urgency around the need for effective
revenge porn laws to protect our increasingly vulnerable society. In Part II,
I discuss the existing alternative legal frameworks that victims may pursue
where revenge porn laws do not exist or have otherwise been held
unconstitutional. I shed light on the shadow taxonomy that pervades the
judicial language of the very few revenge porn cases that have been litigated
vigorously enough for courts to produce opinions. I also explore the history
of revenge porn laws in Minnesota with specific reference to Minnesota
Statutes section 617.261. In Parts III and IV, I discuss the First Amendment
as it applies to the State v. Casillas 19 decisions. Specifically, in Part III, I
summarize the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in which the court
overturned the respondent’s conviction under section 617.261 under the
overbreadth doctrine. In Part IV, I analyze the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
reversal of the court of appeals’ holding under the strict-scrutiny analysis.
II.

A.

HISTORY

Existing Legal Frameworks

Scholars disagree as to what the best routes of recourse for
revenge porn victims are. Some scholars suggest that victims should seek
legal recourse, while others suggest that commercial solutions, such as
obtaining the services of online reputation management firms, is the more
practical route. 20 This Section will briefly discuss the existing legal
frameworks available to victims of revenge porn in copyright law, tort law,
or criminal statutes.
With regard to copyright law, the Copyright Act grants
constitutionally-guaranteed copyright protections under federal law to

narrowly tailored. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A) (West, Westlaw through April 20,
2021) (“The image is disclosed with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce
the depicted person.”).
Phillip Takhar, A Proposal for a Notice-and-Takedown Process for Revenge Porn, HARV.
J.L. & TECH. DIG. (2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-proposal-for-a-notice-andtakedown-process-for-revenge-porn [https://perma.cc/27ZS-QC76].
938 N.W.2d 74, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019); 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020).
Vora, supra note 2, at 233.
18

19
20
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authors that create original work, including photographs and videos. 21
Victims may bring copyright infringement claims against their perpetrator in
civil court. 22 However, typically only victims who took their own picture or
video have standing to bring forth copyright infringement claims. 23
Shockingly, “[t]o obtain copyright privileges necessary to enable a copyright
infringement claim against a website in instances where the images were
taken with consent by another person other than the victim, the victim must
copyright the exposed parts of her body by registering it with the
government.” 24 This route requires the victim to voluntarily expose the most
intimate parts of her body to the government in order for the government
to be equipped to protect her. 25 Without undergoing this arduous process,
some websites will continue to host the content online, as they are very likely
protected by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). 26
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), victims
may bring copyright infringement claims against service providers that host
their photographs or videos in order to obtain injunctive relief. 27 However,
once the service provider removes the content, it is immune from liability,
even when other service providers or viewers have saved or reproduced the
content. 28 Furthermore, victims face additional nuanced issues in bringing
forth copyright infringement claims: (1) the victim is likely unable to stop
further reproduction of their content, (2) it would be costly to pursue
multiple cases against other individuals or service providers that shared the
content, and (3) the victim cannot stop their content from being archived on
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(5) (2012); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work protected
under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”). Samantha H. Scheller,
A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: The Legal Implications of Revenge Porn, 93 N.C.
L. REV. 551, 583 (2015).
Scheller, supra note 21, at 583.
Id. Victims who were photographed or filmed by another typically would not be able to
bring forth copyright infringement claims against that person because ownership of the
content only extends to the person who took the photo or video. Id.
Erica Fink, To Fight Revenge Porn, I had to Copyright my Breasts, CNN (Apr. 27, 2015),
money.cnn.com/2015/04/26/technology/copyright-boobs-revenge-porn/index.html?iid=EL
[https://perma.cc/45KT-KT3J].
21

22
23

24

25

Id.

Although the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images and videos is not
recognized as an exception under section 230, this law does not apply to: (1) federal criminal
laws, (2) intellectual property laws, (3) laws “consistent with” section 230; the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, and (5) laws that prohibit sex trafficking. VALERIE C.
BRANNON, LIABILITY FOR CONTENT HOSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNICATION
DECENCY ACT’S SECTION 230, at 3 (2019).
Vora, supra note 2, at 233–34.
26

27
28

Id.
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the Internet. Realistically, the most the victim may do is regularly check to
see if the images or videos appear on websites, and then individually request
those websites to remove the content. 29 Without question, this constant
monitoring can very quickly become costly and futile as it repeatedly
traumatizes victims into perpetual states of shame and paranoia.
With regard to tort law, victims may pursue various tort claims
against their perpetrators, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”), 30 public disclosure of private facts, 31 defamation, 32 false light, 33 and
intrusion upon seclusion. 34 Although victims may be successful in their tort
claims, these claims typically have many limitations. For example,
oftentimes, the victim must be able to identify the perpetrator. 35 However,
this is not always the case—perpetrators may use pseudonyms to hide their
identities or their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. 36 Without the ability to
immediately identify the poster or posters to bring claims, the victim may
have to collect identifying information. 37 Where such information is
29

Id. at 234–35.

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 303, at 826 (2000). To prove IIED, a victim must
show that there was (1) an intentional or reckless act (2) that is extreme and outrageous and
(3) causes severe emotional distress. See Scheller, supra note 21, at 581–82 (explaining the
elements of IIED).
Scheller, supra note 21, at 578. Public disclosure of private facts requires a public disclosure
of private facts that are “highly offensive to a reasonable person (an objective standard) and
that the subject matter must not be of legitimate public concern.” Id. The victim must show
that there was public disclosure, that the private facts or content were true and not a part of
a public record, that the dissemination would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
that the public would not have a significant interest in the content. Id. at 579.
Id. at 569. Under a defamation claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant caused
actual damages resulting from the publication of defamatory statements about the plaintiff.
If there is no falsity at issue, then there is no defamation claim. Id. Furthermore, plaintiffs
must show that the dissemination of the sexual content included an injurious false
communication. See Taylor v. Franko, No. CIV. 09-00002 JMS, 2011 WL 2746714, at *1
(D. Haw. July 12, 2011) (holding defendant liable for defamation, among other rights of
action, for posting sexual images of plaintiff with her contact information, claiming that she
was interested in a “visit or phone call”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. L. INST. 1977) (stating that one may be
liable to another under if “(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would
be placed.”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”).
Vora, supra note 2, at 240.
30

31

32

33

34

35
36

Id.

Robert G. Larson & Paul A. Godfread, Bringing John Doe to Court: Procedural Issues in
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Defendants, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 328, 329–30
37

(2011).
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available—as it is possible that internet users are able to maintain untraceable
anonymity—victims may use that information to name defendants
“pseudonymously” and then work to obtain more identifying information
through an expedited discovery stage. 38 These measures usually require the
victim to seek professional investigation services.
Yet, even where the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator,
the ability to pursue civil cases is mostly reserved for plaintiffs who have trust
in the judicial system and access to the financial means to use it. 39 Thus,
because tort claims fall within the realm of civil litigation, the pursuit of a
tort claim arguably is practical only for middle- and upper-class White
victims because low-income victims or victims of color may not have the
economic and legal resources to pursue civil cases or may not trust the
United States court systems. 40 Furthermore, even in instances where a victim
does have the means to both identify and sue the perpetrator, a successful
holding in favor of the victim’s claim may still be insufficient because the
defendant may not have the financial means to pay damages. 41
Disseminating revenge porn is as easy as pressing “send,” and anyone with
the intention to do so can, regardless of their class, social status, and inability
to pay the repercussions.
With regard to criminal statutes, there is no federal law that
criminalizes the dissemination of private sexual content. 42 Within the realm
of Congress’s powers to enact law, Congress may only regulate: (1) the use
of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities, persons or
things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce. 43 Although victims and prosecutors may try to seek
38
39

Id. at 338.
Id. at 339–41 (“In practice, first, the plaintiff sues a fictitious ‘John Doe.’ The plaintiff then

obtains the court’s permission to subpoena identifying information from the relevant OSPs
[online service providers]. Once the plaintiff obtains such information from the OSPs, the
plaintiff amends the complaint to name the person identified by the OSPs. . . . [I]t appears
that courts are generally willing to allow the plaintiff to proceed with expedited discovery so
as to uncover the identity of the would-be defendant.”).
Sara S. Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1288–89
(2016) (explaining that inaction to pursue civil cases was due to (1) past experiences and
perceptions of the criminal and civil justice systems discouraged trust of the civil system; (2)
belief that the judicial system was unfair and tended to favor the party that had “money to
pay for an expensive lawyer;” (3) negative experiences with the courts and other public
institutions caused for negative feelings about the legal system; and (4) respondents’ selfsufficiency beliefs that they could handle their own problems without reliance of the judicial
system). Moreover, Black people are more likely than White people to believe that the
judicial system is corrupted. Id. at 1307.
Vora, supra note 2, at 237–38.
State Revenge Porn Policy, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/state-policy/revengeporn/ [https://perma.cc/6XH3-LJKS] (“[F]ederal law does not provide a remedy to victims
of nonconsensual pornography . . . .”).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
40

41
42

43
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justice through other federal laws, 44 Congress has not recognized
nonconsensual pornography or its “disclosure” as a category of interstate
commerce. Yet, one could argue that revenge porn content should be
regulated as interstate commerce due to a general consensus among states
that the contents of revenge porn are tangible, that the dissemination needs
to be regulated, and that the content and nature of its dissemination crosses
state lines through the Internet. 45
In 2017, Vice President Kamala Harris, in her role then as a
United States Senator, introduced to Congress the “Ending Nonconsensual
Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017,” otherwise known as the
ENOUGH Act. 46 The bill, which was drafted to fit within Congress’s
commerce powers, made it “unlawful to knowingly distribute a private,
visual depiction of an individual’s intimate parts or of an individual engaging
in sexually explicit conduct, with reckless disregard for the individual’s lack
of consent to the distribution, and for other purposes.” 47 However, Congress
did not enact the bill. 48 Thus, we have yet to see a federal law emerge that
successfully expands, or perhaps a case that effectively challenges, the scope
of interstate commerce to include the dissemination of nonconsensual
pornography. 49
In absence of a federal law, victims must rely on their state
legislatures to pass or create these protections. Revenge porn laws vary from
state to state, as there is no general consensus standardizing the definition
of the crime or selection of statutory language. For example, state
legislatures have failed to pass proposed bills addressing nonconsensual
dissemination of sexual images or videos in Alabama, Connecticut, Florida,
Kentucky, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington. 50 Many of the state
statutes that were indeed passed may not withstand judicial scrutiny and may
need to undergo legislative reconstruction. 51 Furthermore, in consideration
Mary Anne Franks, Combating Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper 5–7
(Sept. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Franks,
Combating] (discussing potentiality and limitations of existing federal laws that prosecutors
and victims may rely upon, those being the federal laws regarding sexual exploitation and
abuse of children, the Interstate Anti-Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act, the Video
Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
Id. at 11 (stating that information transmitted through the Internet qualifies as “interstate
commerce” and is within the powers of Congress to regulate).
ENOUGH Act, S. 2162, 115th Cong. (2017).
44

45

46

Id.
Id.
See Franks, Combating, supra note 44, at 11.
Barmore, supra note 12, at 455–56.
See MINN. STAT. § 617.261 (2016) (struck down by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in
2019). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess.
47
48
49
50
51

86th Leg.) (passed in 2015 and reformed by Texas legislature in 2019 to include “intent to
harm”).
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of the First Amendment, these criminal statutes are often too narrow to
apply to all cases of revenge porn or too broad, both of which give rise to
issues of constitutionality and prompt courts to strike them down. 52
Arkansas’s revenge porn statute is an example of an overly narrow
law. 53 It protects only victims whose perpetrator was a family member, a
member of the victim’s household, or a person with whom the victim is
currently or formerly in a dating relationship with. 54 Thus, under this law,
victims in Arkansas have no recourse against a perpetrator who does not fit
into these strict categories, leaving victims unprotected in the context of
subsequent dissemination, such as reproduction of the content that takes
place online, through the mail, or through text message.
Criminal statutes today lack a solution for victims whose content
has been posted on wider mediums, such as social media platforms,
pornography websites, and other service providers. 55 Critics argue that
although criminal liability may act as a deterrent, it does not provide victims
with complete justice. 56 Even though victims may see their perpetrators
successfully prosecuted under the law and be entitled to monetary damages,
these laws do not seek to remove the images from the Internet, nor do they
protect victims from future social and mental harm caused by the further
dissemination of their private content from other posters. 57 These critics
argue that federal and state laws need to “provide more robust remedies”
that include: (1) a private right of action against anyone who posts the private
content without consent regardless of whether the person created the image
and (2) an injunction against any website that hosts the content. 58 With that
said, an injunction of this caliber may be difficult, if not impossible, for state
legislatures, as websites and service providers are generally protected by
immunity under section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act
(CDA). 59
State Revenge Porn Policy, supra note 42 (“The purpose of state revenge porn laws should
be to protect victims from harassment and abuse as well as the ongoing harms that result
from distribution of nonconsensual pornography. But some of the state laws include
provisions do not help victims and, in some cases, could make things worse.”).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-314 (West, Westlaw through April 15, 2021).
Id. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-4 (West, Westlaw through March 25, 2021)
(limiting nonconsensual pornography to only photographs and videos that were taken
without consent).
State Revenge Porn Policy, supra note 42.
Id. (“Criminal liability for the perpetrator, while important, is not enough. While criminal
liability may have a deterrent effect, victims face ongoing harm from the dissemination and
access to their images without consent. This harm can be more effectively remedied by
removing the nonconsensual pornographic material.”).
52

53
54

55
56

57
58
59

Id.
Id.

Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
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State statutes that criminalize revenge porn must be carefully
written because they cannot supersede federal law. Section 230 “provides
interactive computer services with immunity [because] the interactive
computer services are not considered publishers of the content their users
post.” 60 This legislation protects websites and service providers in both tort
and criminal proceedings even when the websites are the very source that
enables the content to be continuously shared and reproduced. 61 They are
essentially untouchable in terms of liability, with exclusion to violations of
child pornography, obscenity, criminal, or intellectual property laws. 62
Where victims consented to the image or video being taken but did not
consent to the upload, section 230 offers no remedy beyond a safe harbor
exception in which the victim must produce a copyright infringement
claim. 63 This may be an effective route for most revenge porn victims
because, as stated, eighty percent of revenge porn content are “selfies.” Yet,
again, only individuals who took their own photos or videos of their bodies
are considered “original creators,” which is necessary to make a copyright
claim to the content, resulting in a large demographic of revenge porn
victims being precluded from this legal remedy. 64
Furthermore, courts rarely hold these websites and service
providers liable for their involvement in the perpetuation of revenge porn
content and instead often uphold the immunity privileges provided to these
companies. In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, a case in which an actress sued
Matchmaker.com for a profile created of her by an unknown person, the
court held that the website had no liability because it “did not play a
significant role in creating, developing, or ‘transforming’ the relevant
information.” 65 The court reasoned that Congress’s intent in granting service
providers immunity under section 230 was to “promote the free exchange
of information and ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary
monitoring for offensive or obscene material.” 66
In GoDaddy.com v. Toups, victims brought suit against
GoDaddy, an interactive computer service provider that hosted two revenge
porn websites where the victims’ photos were posted. 67 The Texas Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling against GoDaddy.com. 68 The
Vora, supra note 2, at 238. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018) (“No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”).
Vora, supra note 2, at 238.
Levendowski, supra note 6.

60

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
See Section II.A.

Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003).

Id. at 1122.
See generally GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2014).
Id. at 753.
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court ruled that GoDaddy.com was not liable because of congressional
intent for the CDA to have a broad application of immunity 69 and because
the CDA is not limited to constitutionally-protected material. 70 With this
said, victims are highly unlikely to find resolution against the websites that
host such content as long as the content was posted by a third party.
In line with the existing legal frameworks, victims may seek the
alternative route of employing extralegal commercial remedies. For
example, online reputation management firms use search engine
optimization to “push[] positive content and information about an
individual towards the first page of search results,” which simultaneously
pushes the negative material, such as site locations, deeper into the search
query. 71 By doing so, although the firms lack the ability to remove the
content, the firms help the victims better control their reputations by
decreasing the likelihood that such content would be found. 72
Yet, commercial remedies are not accessible to all victims because
these services are expensive and often need to be employed over long
periods of time. 73 Online reputation management firms may charge
anywhere from $100 to $100,000. 74 For example, one such firm,
Reputation-Defender, charges anywhere between $3,000 to $15,000 for its
services. 75 Costs may become excessively steep because victims will require
ongoing monitoring and search engine optimization to prevent the content
from being easily discoverable. 76 This route, like that of civil suits, is
primarily reserved for victims who have the financial means to pursue it.
In conclusion, criminal statutes and civil remedies that are
applicable or related to revenge porn laws at best and when constitutional,
still fail to address all the systemic and nuanced parts of victim suffering. 77
For example, “stalking and harassment laws are not applicable to revenge
porn submitters because there is no repeated course of conduct or direct
communication with the victim.” 78 Criminal statutes must be enacted to
provide victims appropriate remedies, particularly because many victims
lack the financial and legal means to pursue civil cases against their
perpetrators. Even for those victims who can afford to pursue such civil
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 759.
Id.
Vora, supra note 2, at 241.
Id.
Id.
See generally Joseph Torrillo, Online Reputation Management Cost & Pricing Explained,

REPUTATIONMANAGEMENT.COM (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.reputationmanagement.com/
blog/reputation-management-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/FFT2-XEVG].
Vora, supra note 2, at 241.
75
76
77
78

Id.

Barmore, supra note 12, at 456.
Levendowski, supra note 6.
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claims, a successful ruling in their favor does not guarantee protection from
future harm, as the laws do not specifically prevent the subsequent
dissemination of the harmful content. Neither does a favorable ruling
guarantee paid damages. Lastly, a victim risks “unleashing more unwanted
publicity” merely by attaching their real name to a suit. 79

B.

The Shadow Taxonomy of Judicial Language

Notwithstanding the fact that very few revenge porn cases are
litigated to the extent that judicial opinions are written, several courts that
have produced opinions ruled in favor of defendants. Critics argue that
victims are undermined in the courts by a “shadow taxonomy.” Scholars
define “shadow taxonomy” as judicial language within court opinions that
“reveal the underlying power dynamics [that] ultimately reveal that the
shadow taxonomy works to trivialize the very harms for which the
established legal framework purports to offer remedy.” 80 These insidious
subtleties folded within judicial language illustrate how courts acknowledge
the harms suffered by victims but have the unnerving tendencies to support
the defendants. 81
An analysis of judicial language depicts the existence of a shadow
taxonomy and how it minimizes and disregards the harm suffered by
revenge porn victims. 82 As scholars have argued, “[w]ithout addressing the
actual harms the plaintiff-victims experienced in this case, the court
effectively wipes those harms away from existence. Thus, the court is
perpetuating a discourse in which women’s harms are trivialized.” 83 In
addition to silencing victim suffering, judicial language typically does not
recognize or acknowledge the “amplification effect,” otherwise known as the
repeated and potentially exponential dissemination of the victim’s content
by derivative posters. 84 The court’s disregard may be due to the protections
provided by section 230, but the court’s failure to acknowledge how websites
Citron & Franks, supra note 14, at 358. Victims may also hide their identity under the guise
of a pseudonym. Id.
Vora, supra note 2, at 243.
79

80
81
82

Id.
See People v. Barber, 42 Misc. 3d 1225(A), *1–8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb 18, 2014) (making

no mention of any harms suffered by the victim as a result of the defendant posting her nude
photos to his Twitter account). See also GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752,
753 (Tex. App. 2014) (mentioning only harms suffered by the victim coincidentally while
listing the plaintiff’s alleged tort claims without any additional description of harm).
Vora, supra note 2, at 231, 246 (“As the amplification effect occurs, the amount of viewers
of the initial revenge porn post increases exponentially. However, as the amount of viewers
increases, so decreases the likelihood that the victim can: (1) locate all of her photos on the
Internet and (2) identify all of the subsequent reposters.”).
See GoDaddy.com, 429 S.W.3d at 753 (court does not mention the harmful effects caused
by the revenge porn websites hosting of the victims’ images and videos).
83

84
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perpetuate such harms is a continued act of silencing. 85 “The silencing of
these harms works to both erase them from precedent, and from memory,
and simultaneously perpetuates the notion that website intermediaries are
not responsible for the behavior of subsequent reposters (or other content
providers), even though it is the intermediary’s platform that sustains such
harassment.” 86
When the amplification effect is indeed mentioned, courts merely
mention it as background information, often in the context of factual
information or the footnotes of an opinion. 87 Courts have also employed
specific verbiage that diminishes the seriousness of victims’ experiences. For
example, in People v. Barber, “the court uses trivializing words at least eight
times––an average of once per page,” by attaching the words “mere,”
“simply,” and “only” when describing the defendant’s conduct of posting
the victim’s private sexual images on his Twitter account. 88 In doing so,
victims are ultimately denied full justice and protection of the law because
the harms that stem directly from the reproduction of the private content
are made inconsequential.
To conclude, these opinions either fail to fully grasp the severity
of the defendants’ conduct, nor the harms that victims experienced,
resulting in the courts, again, ultimately silencing the victims. 89 To remedy
this, feminist scholars have argued that courts would have “more compelling
argument[s]” against defendants where the harms suffered by the victims are
included in the analyses. 90 However, since the court’s acts are also deeply
rooted in society’s treatment and portrayal of women, 91 the courts must
approach revenge porn cases with an especially critical eye.
III.

APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Under the First Amendment, Congress may not pass a law that
prohibits the free exercise of speech or abridges the freedom of speech. 92

85
86
87

Vora, supra note 2, at 246.
Id.
See id. at 247; Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 158–69 (Tex. App. 2016) (the court

dedicates ten pages to discussing the defendant’s threatening language to victim, but it is
presented as background information and not within the analysis itself).
Vora, supra note 2, at 248; People v. Barber, 42 Misc. 3d 1225(A), *2–8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Feb 18, 2014).
See Vora, supra note 2, at 246 (“[R]efusing to name or identify someone or something
through language is to silence it, wipe it, and censor it from existence; the practice of silencing
is ‘part and parcel of the veiling process that accompanies the wielding of power.’”).
88

89

90
91

Id.
Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
92
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However, the Court “reject[s] the view that freedom of speech and
association . . . as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are
absolutes.” 93 Although there is no dominant theory as to how the First
Amendment should be interpreted, the four main theories are that freedom
of speech “is protected to further self-governance, to aid the discovery of
truth via the marketplace of ideas, to promote autonomy, and to foster
tolerance.” 94 The theory of advancing autonomy underscores one’s
personhood, free will, and self-governance. 95 However, critics have argued
that this theory “ignores the ways in which protecting freedom of speech for
some can undermine the autonomy and self-fulfillment of others,” 96 such as
hate speech and racial epithets, 97 or in our case, revenge porn.

A.

The Strict Scrutiny Standard

In order to conduct a First Amendment analysis, courts look to
whether the law in question is content-based or content-neutral. 98 A
“content-based” restriction is one that regulates speech based on its content,
viewpoint, or subject matter 99 or if the application of the law depends on
such. 100 Content-based laws are presumed to be unconstitutional and must
survive strict scrutiny to be upheld. 101 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.”).
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1238 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 5th ed.
2017) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
Id. at 1241.
93
94

95
96

Id.

John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 539, 543 (2006)
(arguing that hate speech should be proscribed). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 380 (1992) (invalidating a statute that barred using a symbol, objection, appellation,
characterization, or graffiti to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in others based on race,
color, creed, religion, or gender).
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1242 (stating courts find this
distinction is “crucial” in determining which judicial scrutiny is applicable). See, e.g., Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 865 (1991) (providing an
example of content-neutral laws, in which “a prohibition against sound trucks in residential
neighborhoods during the nighttime hours would be supported by interests unrelated to the
message communicated and would therefore be tested under a much less stringent test than
would a content-based regulation.”).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding a restriction is contentbased if it was “adopted . . . because of disagreement with the message [the speech]
conveys.”).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000) [hereinafter
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality].
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1244. The Supreme Court has
ruled that “above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
97

98

99

100

101
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restriction “may be justified only if the government proves that [it is]
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” 102 “Narrowly tailored”
requires that the statute be the “least restrictive means” necessary to carry
out the government’s compelling interests, although the means used are not
required to be perfectly tailored. 103 The state interest must be an “actual
problem” that requires solution. 104 The Court has acknowledged that
content-based restrictions may allow the government to “effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” 105
However, a content-neutral law is impartial both in terms of the
subject matter and the viewpoint. 106 “Content-neutral” laws may be deemed
constitutional where the law is justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech. 107 A law is “justified” if it falls within “the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.” 108 If the law is content-neutral, courts must apply
intermediate scrutiny. 109 Any law may violate the First Amendment without
undergoing judicial scrutiny if the law is unduly vague or overbroad. 110

B.

The Overbreadth Doctrine

Laws that regulate speech may be invalidated under the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines 111 unless they can be cured or partially severed. 112
These doctrines are unique because defendants can challenge the law’s
constitutionality even if the defendant’s own incriminating speech was not
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content,” and that
“[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” Id. See also Police Dep’t of Chi. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000).
Id. at 822.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991).
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 100, at 50.
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 100, at 55 (“In Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, the Court said that the general rule is that content-based restrictions on speech
must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral regulations only need meet intermediate
scrutiny.”).
102
103
104
105

106
107
108
109

110

Id.

The Supreme Court has not made a clear distinction between vagueness and overbreadth.
See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of
Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1283.
111

112
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of a category protected by the First Amendment. 113 With regard to the
overbreadth doctrine, it is generally reserved only for laws that target speech,
including both “pure” speech and expressive conduct, and it may otherwise
not be used for laws that do not pertain to the First Amendment. 114 A law is
overbroad, and thus unconstitutional, “if it regulates substantially more
speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated, and a person to whom
the law constitutionally can be applied can argue that it would be
unconstitutional as applied to others.” 115
The overbreadth doctrine considers two important aspects. First,
a law must be substantially overbroad, meaning that the law must restrict a
significant amount of protected speech when judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. 116 Although there is no exact definition as
to what accounts as “substantially overbroad,” 117 the Court has stated that
“there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before
the Court.” 118 However, if courts find that the law fails to meet this threshold
of substantially overbroad in that the law does not restrict significant
amounts of protected speech, then the law will not be deemed overbroad
and will stand. 119 Second, a person to whom the law may be constitutionally
applied can validly argue that the law would be unconstitutional as applied
to others because it would infringe upon their rights to speech. 120 The
overbreadth doctrine essentially allows defendants to shift “the focus of the
litigation from the alleged criminal to the law itself . . . from the actual

113

Id. See infra Section III.C.

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating the Court has “recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment”).
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1287.
Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801
(1984).
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1287; see generally Virginia v.
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1287. The overbreadth
challenge is an exception to the general standing rule that “a statute may constitutionally be
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be
applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); see Fallon, supra note 98, at 865 (“[T]he First
Amendment enjoys a special status in the constitutional scheme. Any substantial ‘chilling’ of
constitutionally protected expression is intolerable. Third-party rights are too important to
go unprotected, and there may often be no better challenger than the one before the court.
‘Facial’ attacks on and invalidations of overbroad statutes are therefore permitted in this area
of the law.”).
114

115
116
117
118

119

120
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conduct of the defendant to the hypothetical conduct of others.” 121 Because
this second prong allows a convicted person to overturn the conviction by
successfully bringing forth the overbreadth doctrine, it should only be used
as a last resort. 122

C.

Which to Apply?

Although the Supreme Court has never explained in-depth the
relationship between the overbreadth doctrine and the strict scrutiny
doctrine, the two are separate modes of analysis. 123 Thus, there is no
standard rule as to when a court must apply one over the other, which results
in redundancy when courts apply both or in confusion when different courts
apply different modes of analysis to reach opposite results. 124 Because courts
review constitutional challenges de novo, courts are not required to apply
the lower court’s analysis of the law.
As discussed below, the Minnesota Court of Appeals used the
overbreadth doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of section 617.261 of
the Minnesota Statutes, the revenge porn statute that the defendant was
convicted under and then challenged, in State v. Casillas. 125 The court ruled
in favor of the defendant and deemed the statute unconstitutional under the
overbreadth doctrine, ultimately invalidating the statute altogether. 126
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court went on to reverse the court of
appeals’ holding under the strict scrutiny analysis. 127 The court also held that
the statute was not necessarily overbroad. In its opinion, the court took a
rare opportunity to set a standard where a scrutiny analysis trumps an
overbreadth analysis when both doctrines are applicable to a First
Amendment issue. 128
IV.

DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF MINNESOTA
STATUTES § 617.261

See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 6:4 (2017) (emphasis omitted) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432
(1963)).
See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; see also Smith v. Martens, 106 P.3d 28, 37–38 (Kan.
2005); People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 636 (Colo. 1999).
Marc Rohr, Parallel Doctrinal Bars: The Unexplained Relationship Between Facial
Overbreadth and “Scrutiny” Analysis in the Law of Freedom of Speech, 11 ELON L. REV.
95, 109 (2019).
Id. at 133–34.
938 N.W.2d 74, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 87–88.
State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020).
Id. at 645–46; see infra Part VI.
121

122

123

124
125
126
127
128
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In 2016, Minnesota became the thirty-third state to criminalize
the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. 129 On December
23, 2019, the Minnesota Court of Appeals invalidated the law following their
ruling of State v. Casillas. 130 When the statute was overturned, revenge porn
victims relied on less effective alternatives to protect themselves and to press
charges on their perpetrators, relying instead, for example, on emergency
harassment restraining orders or defamation charges. 131 On December 30,
2020, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the court of
appeals’ decision. 132
Under section 617.261, it is a misdemeanor to
intentionally disseminate an image of another person who
is depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are
exposed, in whole or in part, when (1) the person is
identifiable; . . . (2) the actor knows or reasonably should
know that the person depicted in the image does not
consent to the dissemination; and (3) the image was
obtained or created under circumstances in which the actor
knew or reasonably should have known the person
depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 133
However, the criminal penalty will be elevated to a felony charge if the
actor’s conduct meets any of the factors described in subdivision 2. These
factors are:
(1) the person depicted in the image suffers financial loss
due to the dissemination of the image; (2) the actor
disseminates the image with intent to profit from the
dissemination; (3) the actor maintains an Internet website,
Sharon Yoo, A Refresher on Minnesota’s Revenge Porn Laws, KARE 11 (Oct. 29, 2019),
kare11.com/article/news/local/breaking-the-news/katiehillsresignationbringsrevengepornto
forefront/89-85e5b730-8f87-44fb-9bf9-9a118bc8a3cc
[https://perma.cc/A9J5-66UV].
Authored by Minnesota House Representative John Lesch of District 66B, Lesch stated that
he was driven to write the bill after hearing the story of Rehtaeh Parsons, a seventeen-yearold girl who committed suicide after photos of her engaged in a sexual act with a school
football player were shared around her high school, and the story of Timothy Turner, a
Minnesota resident who was convicted of criminal defamation for disseminating photos of
his ex-girlfriend and her daughter online. See State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d. 204 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2015).
Yoo, supra note 129; Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 74.
Briana Bierschbach, ‘Revenge Porn’ Cases Have Lawmakers Looking for a Fix, STAR
TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2020), http://www.startribune.com/revenge-porn-cases-have-lawmakerslooking-for-a-fix/567494832/ [https://perma.cc/F5TP-Q4FY] (writing about a woman who
had to rely on an emergency harassment restraining order after her ex-boyfriend
disseminated photos of her on Snapchat after the court of appeals invalidated section
617.261); see supra Section II.A.
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d. at 634.
MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 1 (2016).
129

130
131

132
133
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online service, online application, or mobile application for
the purpose of disseminating the image; (4) the actor posts
the image on a website; (5) the actor disseminates the image
with intent to harass the person depicted in the image; (6)
the actor obtained the image by committing a violation of
section 609.52, 609.746, 609.89, or 609.891; or (7) the
actor has previously been convicted under this chapter. 134
V.

A.

STATE V. CASILLAS

Facts and Procedural Posture

In 2017, Michael Anthony Casillas was charged with felony
nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images under section
617.261. 135 A.K.M., the victim, alleged in her complaint that she and Casillas
were in a relationship and that when the relationship ended, Casillas used
her account log-in information to access her wireless and television provider
accounts. 136 With access to her cellular device and its contents, he had access
to her private sexual images and videos. Casillas then informed A.K.M. that
he planned to distribute the content. 137 A.K.M. later received a screenshot
of a video depicting herself and another individual engaged in sexual activity,
at which point the video had already been sent to forty-four other recipients
and posted online. 138
In district court, Casillas moved to dismiss the charge on the basis
that section 617.261 violated the First Amendment for being overbroad and
vague. 139 The district court rejected his motion to dismiss because his
conduct fit within the scope of the statute in that he “intentionally
disseminated an identifiable image of A.K.M. depicted in a sexual act.” 140
The court determined that section 617.261 regulated obscenity, which is not
a protected speech category under the First Amendment. 141 It reasoned that
Casillas’s conduct satisfied the statute because he threatened A.K.M. that he
134
135
136
137
138

Id. § 617.261, subdiv. 2.
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 77.
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 78.
Id; see City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (holding invalid a law that made it

illegal to interrupt working police officers because it “criminalize[d] substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech” after defendant was convicted for shouting at the police).
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 74.
139
140
141

Id.
Id. Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subdiv. 4, the parties agreed to proceed under the

appellant’s stipulation to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of the district court’s
dispositive pretrial ruling, in which the district court determined that appellant was guilty of
felony nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images because his conduct satisfied
section 617.261’s intentional dissemination requirement.
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was going to post her image online, demonstrating that he knew A.K.M.
would not consent to the dissemination. 142
The court also found that the State proved “the image was
obtained under circumstances in which [Casillas] knew or reasonably
should have known [that A.K.M.] had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.” 143 It reasoned that A.K.M.’s expectation of privacy was “implicitly
inherent” because of (1) the sexual nature of the act depicted, (2) Casillas’s
demonstration of awareness that A.K.M. would not consent to the
dissemination, and (3) that Casillas knew, or reasonably should have known,
that A.K.M. had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 144 The district court
convicted Casillas of felony nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual
images, denied his motion for a downward dispositional sentencing
departure, and ordered him to serve twenty-three months in prison. 145
Casillas appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.

B.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Overbreadth Analysis

On appeal, Casillas argued to the court of appeals that the district
court erred in its ruling and that section 617.261 was unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague and thus facially invalid under the First Amendment. 146
The court evaluated the statute’s First Amendment issue under the
overbreadth doctrine by determining the following elements: (1) whether
the statute had a broad sweep; 147 (2) if its sweep was limited to expressive
conduct proscribed by the First Amendment; 148 (3) if it prohibited conduct
beyond its legitimate sweep; 149 (4) if it violated the First Amendment by
prohibiting a substantial amount of protected speech; 150 and (5) if it could be
saved by narrowing or severing certain words, phrases, or provisions. 151
With regard to the breadth of section 617.261, the court
conducted a de novo review of the statute’s constitutionality. 152 The court
began with a general description of the First Amendment and its
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 78 (citing Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Minn. 2014)). An appellate

court must review a lower court’s determination of the constitutionality of a statute under de
novo review. Statutes that allegedly restrict the First Amendment rights are not presumed to
be constitutional. See Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), review
denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).

1236

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

constitutional powers. 153 In evaluating Casillas’s argument that section
617.261 was facially overbroad, the court presented the ways one would
bring forth an overbreadth challenge: first, “a challenger must establish that
no set of circumstances exists under which the challenged statute would be
valid or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” 154 Second, “a law
may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep.’” 155 The latter option here allows for any litigant, such as Casillas, to
contest the statute via a facial overbreadth challenge in a “prophylactic”
effort to invalidate it as a means to reverse a conviction, 156 even when the
statute may be applied constitutionally to that litigant’s set of
circumstances. 157
The court applied the four-step analytical framework established
by the United States Supreme Court to evaluate the overbreadth
challenge. 158 First, the court must construe, or interpret, the challenged
statute to determine its scope and sweep. 159 Second, upon understanding
what the statute actually covers, the court must determine whether the
statute is limited to unprotected categories of speech or expressive
conduct. 160 If the statute is not limited to unprotected speech or expressive
conduct, then the court moves to steps three and four, as follows. Third, the
court must determine if the statute proscribes a “substantial proportion” of
protected speech compared to the unprotected speech. 161 This does not

Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 79 (“The First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.’ It applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The First Amendment establishes that the government generally may not
restrict expression because of its messages, ideas, subject matter, or content. The First
Amendment’s protections extend beyond expressions regarding matters of public concern,
and ‘First Amendment principles apply with equal force to speech or expressive conduct on
the Internet.’ ‘The [Supreme] Court has applied similarly conceived First Amendment
standards to moving pictures, to photographs, and to words in books.’”) (citations omitted).
Id. at 79 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)).
Id. (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473). With regard to the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court has applied this method of invalidating a law if a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional when judged against the law’s plainly legitimate sweep as an exception
to the ordinary rules of standing. The exception was created out of fear that the traditional
rules of standing could cause a “chilling effect” on speech. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
Fallon, supra note 98, at 867–71; Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581–82 (1989);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1982).
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 80.
Id. at 79 (applying In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Minn. 2019)).
Id. at 80.
153

154
155

156

157
158
159
160
161

Id.
Id. (stating that the inquiry is “whether the protected speech and expressive conduct make

up a substantial proportion of the behavior the statute prohibits compared with conduct and
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mean that the statute may not proscribe some protected speech—“a statute
is not substantially overbroad merely because one can conceive of some
impermissible applications.” 162 Fourth, if a substantial portion of protected
speech is conscribed, the court must determine whether it may narrow the
statute or sever language to cure it. 163 If the court is unable to cure the statute
by narrowing its construction or severing language, the court must turn to
the last resort option, which is to invalidate the statute entirely. 164
With regard to the first step, the court found that the statute’s
sweep was overly broad. The court stated that the statute’s requirements
were predicated on a broad negligence mens rea; 165 the statute’s language
stated that “the disseminator ‘knows or reasonably should know that the
person depicted in the image does not consent to the dissemination’ and
‘the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which the actor
knew or reasonably should have known the person depicted had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.’” 166 The court also reasoned that the
statute lacks “harm-causing” and “intent-to-harm” elements except when
elevating the disseminator’s conduct from a misdemeanor charge to a felony
conviction. 167 The lack of intent to harm failed to limit the statute’s scope as
to what expressive conduct would be criminalized. 168
With regard to the second step, the court found that the statute’s
sweep was not limited to unprotected speech. 169 Such unprotected speech,
or exceptions to the First Amendment, include: “speech or expressive
conduct designed to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation,
speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called fighting words, child
pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and

speech that are unprotected and may be legitimately criminalized.”) (citing A.J.B., 929
N.W.2d at 847–48).
Id. (quoting A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847–48).
Id. (referencing A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 848).
Id. (summarizing A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 848).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 81–82; see A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 850 (stating that the “‘knows or has reason to
know’ standard—a negligence mens rea—means a person may be convicted under [a statute
that criminalizes stalking] even though the person does not intend or even know that his
communication would frighten, threaten, oppress, persecute, or intimidate the victim.”).
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 82; MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 2(b)(1), (5) (2016) (stating
that the penalties are heightened if, among other conduct, the actor “disseminates the image
with intent to harass the person depicted in the image”) (emphasis added).
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 82.
Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has long permitted some content-based restrictions in a few
limited areas, in which speech is of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from it is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”)
(citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 2014)).
162
163
164
165
166

167

168
169
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imminent threat the government has the power to prevent.” 170 The State
raised its arguments on reliance of this definition of obscenity; 171 but the
court found that this argument misconstrued the application of “patently
offensive.” 172 The measure of obscenity is the content of the work and not
the dissemination of it. 173 Therefore, the court found that section 617.261
would incorrectly subject all images that fall within its regulation as “patently
offensive” even when the contents of the images were not actually “patently
offensive.” 174
The State also raised the argument that section 617.261 offers not a First
Amendment issue but a privacy matter. 175 However, privacy was not a
recognized form of unprotected speech, and the Supreme Court itself has
had a history of reluctance towards expanding the “delineated categories.” 176
Because the court determined that Section 617.26 had a broad
sweep and a reach that was not limited to the unprotected categories of
speech under the First Amendment, the court proceeded to the third and
fourth steps. 177 With regard to the third step, the court analyzed whether
section 617.261 proscribed a substantial amount of constitutionallyprotected speech compared to the unprotected speech the statute could
legitimately prohibit. 178 It raised attention to circumstances that depict
Id.; A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 846 (“First Amendment protections are not limitless. There is
a point where First Amendment protections end and government regulation of speech or
expressive conduct becomes permissible. Exceptions to First Amendment protections
generally fall into several delineated categories that include speech or expressive conduct . .
. .”) (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)); see also Alvarez, 567 U.S. at
722 (“[T]he Court has acknowledged that perhaps there exist ‘some categories of speech that
have been historically unprotected . . . but have not yet been specifically identified or
discussed . . . in our case law.’ Before exempting a category of speech from the normal
prohibition on content-based restrictions, however, the Court must be presented with
‘persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore
unrecognized) tradition of proscription.’”).
See Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 83. The State argued that “[t]he average person would find
that [section 617.261] regulates content that appeals to the prurient interest,” and “people
who disseminate nonconsensual, private sexual images” have a prurient interest in sex. Id.
Furthermore, disseminating nonconsensual sexual images is “patently offensive,” and
thereby barred under section 617.261 for “lack[ing] serious literary, artistic, political, and
scientific value.” Id.
170

171

172
173
174
175
176

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83–84.
See In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019); United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“We in no sense
suggest that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of
expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit
and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.”).
See Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 84–88.
Id. at 88–90.
177
178
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people engaged in sexual acts in which those people also consent to the
dissemination of the photos. 179 The court argued that in such instances,
[t]he statute does not define or explain the circumstances
that should cause someone who observes an image
described . . . to reasonably know that the person depicted
in the image did not consent to its dissemination or that the
image was obtained or created under circumstances in
which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 180
This lack of clarity creates room for a subjective interpretation of the statute
in which “reasonable people could reach different conclusions” of images
and of the ways such images were obtained. 181 Thus, the court found that
section 617.261 proscribed a substantial amount of constitutionallyprotected speech because there could be a substantial number of instances
in which innocent people could easily be prosecuted for disseminating
images that they received without knowledge that the depicted person
lacked consent, without knowledge that the image was obtained or created
under circumstances in which the person would have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and without intent to cause harm. 182
The court also found that section 617.261’s reach was substantial
enough to have a chilling effect on speech. 183 For example, as the court
noted, under the statute, someone with access to a public platform that views
an image of another engaged in a sexual act, or whose intimate parts were
exposed, could be at risk if they disseminate the content further. She or he
could be criminally liable “based on a prosecutor’s subjective belief that the
image’s content should have caused the observer to know that the person
depicted did not consent to the dissemination and that the image was
obtained or created under circumstances indicating that the person depicted
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 184
Id. at 88 (referencing various political acts where citizens publicly advocate for a cause,
such as the Free the Nipple campaign).
Id. at 89 (stating that the district court’s reasoning that A.K.M. had an expectation to keep
her images private was “implicitly inherent from the nature of the act depicted” suggests that
the court recognizes the statute could be subject to one’s own subjectivity).
179

180

Id.
Id.
Id. This exception was created out of fear that the traditional rules of standing could cause
a “chilling effect” on speech. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Chilling
Effect, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “chilling effect” as “[t]he result
181
182
183

of a law or practice that seriously discourages the exercise of a constitutional right, such as
the right to appeal or the right of free speech.”); see also State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166,
170 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the “key concern of the overbreadth doctrine” was to deter
the chilling effect on protected speech).
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 89.

184
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With regard to the fourth step, the court determined that it was
impossible to cure section 617.261 by narrowly construing it or by severing
language. 185 Curing the statute was not within the court’s powers because to
do so would require the court to rewrite it. 186 Even in the instance that the
court were to construe the statute per the State’s request, a conflict would
arise as to whether the criminal penalty constitutes a misdemeanor or felony
charge. 187 Furthermore, the court would not be able to construe or sever the
penalties without adding new language. 188 Because the court found that it was
unable to cure the statute, the court invalidated the statute altogether. 189

C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny Analysis

The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis of Casillas by
determining whether the statute restricted protected speech. 190 If the statute
proscribed only unprotected speech, the respondent’s overbreadth
challenge would fail. 191 The court refused to recognize “substantial invasions
of privacy” as a new category of unprotected speech because the State failed
to present sufficient evidence that the category was a part of “a long (if
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.” 192 The court also
rejected the State’s arguments that the statute applied only to unprotected
categories of speech: indecent speech, speech integral to criminal conduct,
and child pornography. 193 Instead, the court held that the statute covered
some protected speech. 194
The court concluded that it was not necessary to determine
whether the statute was content-neutral (which requires intermediate
scrutiny) or content-based (which requires strict scrutiny) because it found
that the State “met its burden under the more searching strict scrutiny
analysis.” 195 It found that the State had a compelling interest to “safeguard its
185
186
187

Id. at 86.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 85. MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 2(a) states “whoever violates subdivision 1 is

guilty of a gross misdemeanor,” but subdivision 2(b)(5) states that the person is guilty of a
felony if “the actor disseminates the image with intent to harass . . . .”
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 90. The Supreme Court has held that rewriting a statute exceeds
the bounds of judicial power. See U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). Furthermore,
adding statutory language by judicial fiat could deviate starkly from the legislature’s intent.
See Hensel, 901 N.W.2d at 180.
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 86. Invalidating a statute is only permissible as a last resort. See
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,
292 (2008); State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Minn. 2016).
State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 637 (Minn. 2020).
188

189

190
191
192
193
194
195

Id.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 641.
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citizens’ health and safety” by “criminalizing the nonconsensual
dissemination of private sexual images” because of the severe suffering
revenge porn victims endure. 196 The court also found that the State
successfully showed that the statute satisfied the “narrowly tailored” prong
as a “least restrictive means” for several reasons. 197
First, “the Legislature explicitly defined the type of” proscribed
image as one that is “of another person who is depicted in a sexual act or
whose intimate parts are exposed,” to which “sexual act,” “intimate parts,”
and “image” were all defined. 198 Second, the statute only applies to
intentional dissemination of the image. 199 The defendant must “knowingly
and voluntarily disseminate” the image. 200 Dissemination committed with
“negligent, accidental, or even reckless” mens rea does not fall within the
statute. 201 Third, the statute has several exceptions that further narrow its
scope. 202 Fourth, the statute requires the defendant to have acted without
consent. 203 Lastly, the statute only covers private speech, to which “‘[s]peech
on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern’
than speech on public matters that go to the heart of our democratic
system.” 204 Here, the court distinguishes Casillas from In re Welfare of
A.J.B. 205 and State v. Jorgenson 206 in that section 617.261 only covers “private
sexual images,” not speech that is “at the core of protected First
Amendment speech.” 207
Finding that the means were narrowly tailored, the court moved on
to address the overbreadth doctrine. It clarified for the first time when to
apply strict scrutiny instead of an overbreadth challenge: “When a statute is
challenged on both scrutiny and overbreadth grounds, a scrutiny analysis
Id. (recognizing the detrimental effects that nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual
images has on a victim’s mental and emotional wellbeing, including minors, by citing several
statistics).
Id. at 643.
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 1) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 1).
196

197
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Id.
Id. The court lists several exemptions recognized within MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv.

5. These include instances where prosecution may need to disseminate the image; when the
images need to be distributed for medical or mental health treatment; when the images are
“obtained in a commercial setting”; when journalists use the images in matters of public
interest; and when educators and scientists use private sexual images for “legitimate scientific
research or educational purposes.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
203
204

Id.
Id. at 644 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)).

929 N.W.2d 840, 853 (2019).
946 N.W.2d 596, 605 (2020).
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 629 (citing In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 853 (Minn.
2019)).
205
206
207
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should be conducted first. This approach is best because a statute that
survives a scrutiny analysis will necessarily survive the overbreadth
challenge. 208 The overbreadth analysis would be “needlessly redundant.” 209
In conclusion of its analysis, the court reversed and remanded the case,
thereby reinstating section 617.261. 210
VI.

A LOOK AT THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S
STRICT SCRUTINY LEGAL ANALYSIS

The court’s strict scrutiny analysis of section 617.261 was
incomplete because it did not determine whether the government showed
that section 617.261 was the least restrictive means to address revenge
porn. 211 Notably, the analysis began by setting out that the statute must be
“narrowly tailored” with “the least restrictive means,” but it then ends with
“the restriction is justified by a compelling government interest and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest,” never delving into the whether there
are less restrictive means. 212 Yet, a look at precedent reveals that strict
scrutiny analyses have traditionally required an examination of this latter
element. For example, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that the statute at issue failed strict scrutiny
because the government failed to meet the least-restrictive-means element. 213
The Court emphasized that “[n]o one disputes that [the statute] is narrowly
tailored . . . .” 214 Yet, “[i]t was for the Government, presented with a
plausible, less restrictive alternative, to prove the alternative to be ineffective,
and [the statute] to be the least restrictive available means.” 215
This issue was indeed presented to the court. In Casillas, the respondent
argued that a less restrictive alternative existed: civil remedies. 216 The State
goes on to reject this alternative on the grounds that civil remedies are
insufficient because they minimize the seriousness of nonconsensual
pornography and many victims are financially unable to pursue civil cases
against their perpetrators. 217 Yet, the court here does not weigh in on this
issue at all within its analysis.
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id.
Id.
Id. at 646–47.
See id.
Id. at 640, 644 (internal citations omitted).

United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).

Id. at 804.
Id. at 812–13.

Brief for Respondent at 45–46, State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 2020) (No. A190576).
Brief for Appellant at 49, State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 2020) (No. A19-0576);
see also supra Section II.A.
216

217
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Had the court completed its strict scrutiny analysis, it may have
likely rejected the respondent’s argument that civil remedies were the least
restrictive means because of the inequitable systemic barriers that prevent
most victims from pursuing such a route. 218 The court’s acknowledgments
of victim suffering, the complexities in the identification of posters, and the
immunity provided to internet providers seem to suggest that the court
would have found that no less restrictive means did in fact exist.
Interestingly, the question as to the court’s failure, whether by choice or
neglect, to complete their strict scrutiny analysis would have likely served as
additional grounds for a valid appeal to the Supreme Court, as the case itself
meets the Supreme Court’s minimal standards of consideration in that the
case’s central issue arises under the First Amendment and that there are
conflicting decisions on the matter in a number of state courts of last
resort. 219
VII.

ASSESSING THE LANGUAGE OF THE TWO OPINIONS

The difference between the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ and the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s approaches to victims’ experiences is striking.
It is immediately apparent from reading both opinions that the court of
appeals’ analysis was formalistic in nature, 220 whereas the supreme court
applied a much more functional analysis. 221 The court of appeals’ decision
mentioned little to nothing of the effects that nonconsensual dissemination
of sexual content has on victims. The court mentions that in today’s “age of
expansive internet communication, images may be disseminated, received,
and observed with ease.” 222 Yet, the court provides no contextual framework
as to how today’s “age of expansive internet communication” has actually
resulted in the creation and the gross prevalence of revenge porn. Instead,
Supra Section II.A.
See SUP. CT. R. 10. The Court has broad discretion in its power to grant writs of certiorari.
Id. Two factors that the Court may use to determine whether it grant such a petition include,
218
219

but are not limited to, whether “a state court of last resort has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a
United States court of appeals” and whether “a state court or a United States court of appeals
has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court . . . .” Id. It would seem that revenge porn cases argued under free speech
violations would fit the Court’s considerations, but because the Court grants so few petitions
a year, the likelihood of hearing such a case remains low.
State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that the court is
“constitutionally obligated to faithfully apply the law,” despite the harmful effects
disseminating nonconsensual private sexual images cause).
State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 646 (Minn. 2020) (noting that in addition to the legal
analysis, the court must balance the government’s goal of protecting Minnesotans from the
harmful nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images with the protection of free
speech).
Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 88.
220

221
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the court only goes so far as to discuss an individual’s consensual sharing of
his or her own content. 223 Furthermore, there is no mention of the
amplification effect or the like, and A.K.M.’s suffering is merely discussed
as factual background information. 224 In so doing, the court of appeals’
opinion is one that fits quite squarely into feminist scholars’ criticisms as
previously discussed 225: the court’s judicial language is plagued with a shadow
taxonomy that ultimately trivialized and minimized victims’ experiences,
hindering the administration of full justice.
The Minnesota Supreme Court presents a rather policy-driven
opinion and evaluates revenge porn with a much more critical analysis. 226 Its
functional approach was heavily steeped in research about victims’ realities.
For example, the court discussed how revenge porn stripped victims of their
agency and exposed their “most intimate moments to others against [their]
will.” 227 It discussed how the content can be shared with the victim’s “friends,
family, bosses, co-workers, teachers, fellow students, or random strangers
on the internet,” emphasizing that “[t]he effects of revenge porn are so
profound that victims have psychological profiles that match sexual assault
survivors,” to which some victims resort to suicide. 228 It even touches on the
amplification effect in its acknowledgment of the various number of online
websites that can host the content, stating that “[an estimate of ten thousand]
websites feature revenge porn, and social media platforms, such as Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat, allow for explicit content to spread
rapidly.” 229 Although strict scrutiny analyses are very rigid and hard to
overcome, this method may allow courts to critically evaluate the humanity
that drives laws into action.
VIII.

223
224
225
226

CONCLUSION

Id.
See id. at 77–78.
See supra Section II.A.
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 629 (discussing in detail the research regarding the dangers of

revenge porn in both Parts III and IV).
Id. (citing Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998)).
Id. (citing Samantha Bates, Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A Qualitative Analysis of
the Mental Health Effects of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors, 12 FEMINIST
CRIMINOLOGY 3 (2016)) (arguing that the effects of revenge porn are so profound that victims
have psychological profiles that match sexual assault survivors); see Sophia Ankel, Many
Revenge Porn Victims Consider Suicide—Why Aren’t Schools Doing More to Stop it?, THE
GUARDIAN (May 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/may/07/manyrevenge-porn-victims-consider-suicide-why-arent-schools-doing-more-to-stop-it
[https://perma.cc/YY2G-P6RX] (“Tragically, not every victim survives this experience and
some commit suicide as a result of their exposure online.”).
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 629.
227
228

229
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The concept of revenge porn is not new. The practice of using
sexuality against a person as a means to oppress, objectify, and humiliate has
always been prevalent in our society. 230 Yet, revenge porn statutes themselves
are fairly new. 231 These statutes raise tough questions about the First
Amendment and blur the line between legislative intent and freedom of
expression.
Following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in State v.
Casillas, section 617.261 was reinstated. 232 Although it appears that Casillas
did not petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, 233 any revenge
porn case argued under the First Amendment would likely present to the
Court the opportunity to set a judicial standard as to when and whether a
strict scrutiny analysis precludes the overbreadth doctrine. Most
importantly, with such a case, the Court would provide wider protection to
victims and set judicial parameters that state legislatures may apply for more
effective revenge porn statutes. Yet, our constitutional treasure that is the
First Amendment is profound, and it is protected, and the Court will not
merely hear a case for the sake of public interest. 234
To best tackle revenge porn, we need to “deconstruct societal
conceptions about who is worthy of being believed.” 235 Unlike rape cases,
where societal stereotypes around virginity lead to the artificial construction
of an “ideal victim” based on factors such as the victim’s race, age,
relationship to the perpetrator, activity at the time of the offense, use of
drugs or alcohol, and criminal history, no such construct exists in revenge
porn cases. 236 Without an “ideal” victim, society and state actors such as law
See, e.g., Clare McGlynn, Erika Rackley & Ruth Houghton, Beyond ‘Revenge Porn’: The
Continuum of Image-Based Sexual Abuse, FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 25, 27–29 (2017)
230

(examining the “continuum of sexual violence” developed by Liz Kelly and using it as a
framework to analyze revenge porn).
Tal Kopan, States Criminalize ‘Revenge Porn’, POLITICO (2013),
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/states-criminalize-revenge-porn-099082
[https://perma.cc/JT9H-DDRD] (describing how New Jersey was the first state to enact a
revenge porn statute, which was passed in 2004).
Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 646–47.
Following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding on December 30, 2020, the defendant
had ninety days to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. See SUP. CT. R. 13. (stating
that “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment
in any case . . . is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within [ninety] days after
entry of the judgment.”). A search of the United States Supreme Court’s docket yields no
history of the case nor that such a petition was ever filed, although it is possible that such a
petition is pending.
See SUP. CT. R. 10.
Kinlaw, supra note 1, at 431.
Id. at 421 (arguing that “ideal victim theory is a framework for discussing how believability
politics arise in the context of victimhood”).
[T]he ideal victim is
231

232
233

234
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enforcement and prosecutors often blame revenge porn victims for taking
sexual images or videos of themselves. 237 Furthermore, the socioeconomic
and racial backgrounds of victims often determine victims’ status. “In
addition to the inherent tension between the idea of virginal purity and
revenge porn, marginalized groups experience additional barriers to being
perceived as innocent victims.” 238 Minority victims are seen as less innocent
and less pure, and thus they face more barriers in convincing state actors,
the media, and society to recognize and address their victimhood. 239 For
example,
[t]he hypersexualization of black women’s bodies is a
systemic stereotype that is reflected in “society’s attribution
of sex as part of the ‘natural’ role of Black women and
girls.” These stereotypes inform how Black women and
girls are perceived today, as “these stereotypes underlie the
implicit bias that shapes many adults’ views of Black
females as sexually promiscuous, hedonistic, and in need
of socialization.” 240
Until Congress successfully enacts a federal law or revises section
230 of the CDA, revenge porn victims of all genders and races will have to
put their trust in state legislatures to craft effective laws, even though such
laws may be found unconstitutional. By simply having a law in place, states
validate the humiliation, trauma, and violations suffered by victims through
the statute’s categorical identifications of revenge porn as a definitive crime
and the subsequent punitive damages available against perpetrators.
Furthermore, it validates the significance of victims’ experiences to the
police, who, as the first state actors that push a case towards prosecution,
very often resort to blaming the victim, refusing to obtain search warrants
against perpetrators, and disregarding the perpetrator’s acts altogether. 241
1. “weak,” which can be someone who is “sick, old, or very young,” or .
. . innocent; 2. “carrying out a respectable project” when victimized;
3. present somewhere that the victim could not be blamed for being;
4. victimized by an offender who is “big and bad”;
5. victimized by an offender who is unknown to the victim and has no
personal relationship to the victim; and
6. powerful enough to make their case known.
Id. at 422 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 432 (stating “‘the ideal rape victim’” is a virgin, and the “‘perfect virgin’” is someone
who is “‘young, good-looking, straight, and white.’”) (citations omitted).
237

238
239

Id.
Id. (stating a study conducted by Georgetown Law’s Center on Poverty and Inequality

which found that “black girls are perceived as less innocent than white girls.”).
Id. at 423 (internal citations omitted).
Citron & Franks, supra note 14, at 367 (stating “[v]ictims are often told that the behavior
is not serious enough for an in-depth investigation. ‘They are shooed away because, officers
say, they are to blame for the whole mess, since they chose to share their intimate pictures[]’”
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“The normalization of victim blaming not only affects public perception of
victims but also police’s willingness to assist victims. . . . The mere act of
having taken a naked picture delegitimizes victimhood status in the eyes of
police officers.” 242 Thus, although the availability of a law does not guarantee
that police will treat revenge porn victims with respect and urgency, at the
very least, (1) a law legitimizes the criminal nature of revenge porn and better
equips police to recognize and investigate the facts preceding prosecution,
and (2) it simultaneously provides victims relief that the State will have a
legally cognizable claim against their perpetrator. 243
In the age of the #MeToo movement, we must give voice to victims,
not silence them. Adequately addressing revenge porn forces police,
prosecutors, judges, and juries to shift away from victim blaming to a more
proper, and equitable, recognition of victimhood in and outside of revenge
porn cases. These actors must come to detach virginal attributes, such as
chastity and purity, apart from victim realities. 244 Courts must additionally
consider the actual harms suffered by victims, such as the amplification
effect of victims’ photos across the web, in their legal analyses and not
merely within the background information. 245 Such facts should equate to
more than a contextual fact or a footnote. Congress must reform section
230 of the CDA to dispel the immunity provided to companies that
perpetuate the worldwide exposure of non-consensually disseminated
sexual content. And finally, state legislatures must think forwardly as to what
First Amendment challenges will inevitably come to confront prospective
revenge porn laws in order to best construct the statutes to withstand judicial
scrutiny.

and police failed to obtain a warrant or search a defendant’s computer or home due to
disregard of the victim’s experience).
Kinlaw, supra note 1, at 434–35.
Id. at 427–28.
See Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A
Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 148–49 (2001) (“At all
stages of prosecution, they argued, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries relied on rape
myths to discount the possibility that a rape had occurred. Such myths included . . . that only
‘bad’ women are raped, and that women provoke rape through their appearance and
behavior.”) (citations omitted).
Vora, supra note 2, at 246.
242
243
244

245

